Many emerging application domains are being developed for smart living environments. In particular, smart living environments that provide assistance for aging populations are becoming increasingly feasible. Therefore, there is an urgent requirement for a ubiquitous health monitoring (UHM) system. The proposed authentication scheme for UHM system consists of a wireless body area network, inexpensive sensors, a personal mobile device, and a medical server. To prevent fraudulent behavior, the mutual authentication between elements is necessary. However, the current security mechanism for UHM system is not clearly described. In such a way, a secure authentication for UHM system is proposed which can protect the patient-data well and is suitable for currently available wireless sensors.
Introduction
Many emerging application domains are being developed for smart living environments that allow interaction between people, the physical environment, and services. Smart living environments that provide assistance for aging populations are becoming increasingly feasible. An increasingly aging population and chronic illnesses (such as diabetes, cancer, heart disease, and cardiovascular diseases) have led to increased demand for primary home-care services, hospital services, and tele-care services. Healthcare provision mostly focuses on prevention and long-term care. Using diabetes as an example, the occurrence of diabetes in the United States will increase from its current level of about 1 in 10 adults to between 1 in 5 and 1 in 3 adults in 2050 [1] . This trend means that it is necessary to rethink our model for treating patients. In order to address the future health needs of an aging population, costeffective healthcare services must be rapidly established. The health of people in a smart living environment [2, 3] can be continuously monitored and shared with remote caregivers or hospitals.
Many quality mobile medical healthcare services have been developed to support senior citizens in dedicated smart living environments [4, 5] . The medical healthcare environment has expanded from traditional clinics and hospitals to more remote locations. Medical healthcare services now include ambient assisted living, care for seniors and chronic patients, home tele-assistance, healthy lifestyle maintenance, training and monitoring, and health regimes. Ubiquitous health monitoring (UHM) frees people from the need to visit the hospital frequently, and eases the burden on the specialized workforce in healthcare [6] . Medical applications have also expanded from remote (e-health) to mobile (m-health); the focus of ubiquitous medical care systems (u-health) and personal health solutions (p-health) is moving toward patients' families, individuals, and wireless body area networks (WBANs) [7] . Smart living environments are improved by UHM applications. Smart WBAN sensor technology may soon be the industry standard for senior lifestyles [8] .
The main driving force behind these changes has been the use of mobile broadband and emerging healthcare devices and services that track human vital signs and provide interactive services. Personal health records (PHRs) [9] integrate personal health data from various sources (hospitals or the home) and provide complete and accurate personal health and medical records, through the internet or mobile devices, in compliance with security and privacy principles. Most of these records comprise the results of general physical examinations, which can be measured outside the hospital. The rapid developments in medical WBAN sensor devices and mobile devices have brought new technology-driven improvements to the medical healthcare environment. The most frequent application for such devices is in the long-term monitoring of the vital signs (weight, blood pressure (BP), and blood glucose level) of chronic patients via a WBAN in the home. Without the need for measurement in hospitals, patients' health-related parameters can be monitored remotely and continuously and aggregated using a personal mobile device, and then transmitted, processed, and transferred to databases of a medical server (MS).
A medical WBAN sensor (MWS) consists of several small components, such as sensor hardware, a power unit, a processor, memory, and a transmitter or transceiver [10] , attached to or implanted in the body. These establish a shortrange wireless communication link and provide continuous integrated monitoring of vital signs including BP, electrocardiography (ECG), saturation of arterial oxygen (SpO 2 ), and heart rate (HR) without the need for medical personnel or interference of the patient's daily activities. These measurements can be recorded over a long period of time, improving the quality of care. Figure 1 shows the general architecture of a medical WBAN used for UHM. Several MWSs are placed in clothes, on, or around the patient's body. The sensors measure the vital signs of the patient. The MWS readings and patient profiles make up the patient-related data. The sensors collect and transmit the patient-related data to a personal device (PD), such as a tablet computer and a smart phone. A PD provides a display and information processing for the patient and gathers all of the information acquired by the sensors for transmission to a remote MS via a mobile network or a WLAN. The patientrelated health data from all MWSs are eventually sent to a centralized MS healthcare database for permanent storage and further data processing. Authorized healthcare staff, physicians, and family members can then view specific health information for a patient via the internet. Other MSs or healthcare systems can also exchange information via the MS. The combination of the information from intra-body WMSs and extra-body communication between the PD and the MS allows ubiquitous healthcare service provision [6] . 
Security and privacy concerns for UHM
Recently, many new UHM projects using WBAN services have emerged, such as C-SMART [11] , CodeBlue [12] , AMON [13] , SAPHIRE [14] , and THE-MUSS [15] . UHM systems that use medical WBAN technologies face many challenges, such as power consumption, reliability of vital sign data transmission, storage, and connectivity [6, 10] . Another key factor in the acceptance of WBANs for healthcare applications is the provision of adequate security. The architecture for UHM using MWSs is shown in Fig. 1 . The patient's sensitive health information is broadcast via wireless communication. Because everyone can intercept the information via air, the malicious users hide and are hard to detect in a wireless environment. The data transmitted in wireless environment can be accessed in an unauthorized manner and modified by malicious users, which poses significant risks for the patient. Therefore, security is a main concern for UHM applications that use medical WBANs.
Traditional security mechanisms are complex and require lots resources, so they cannot be directly used for the extremely resource-limited MWSs. MWS's security requirements, namely authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability, are the same as those for traditional networks. Resource-aware security protocols have become a critical issue for UHM applications that use wireless medical sensor networks. Security and privacy protection mechanisms use a significant part of the available resources and must be energy-efficient and computationefficient. A number of schemes have been proposed to address the security and privacy issues associated with healthcare provision over sensor networks [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . In addition, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides rules for healthcare providers, allowing individuals' vital signs to be read only by authorized professionals (such as physicians and caregivers) and family members [23] . A healthcare provider that allows a malicious or unauthorized user to access health data is in violation of HIPAA [23] . Therefore, key management for user authentication that prevents unauthorized access to patients' vital signs is one of the most crucial components in UHM applications.
This paper considers the healthcare architecture and security goals for remote healthcare applications and proposes a user authentication framework for remote health monitoring applications that use MWSs. The proposed scheme requires that each user firstly proves his authenticity in order to access the patient's vital signs. In addition, this scheme establishes a secure session key between users and sensor nodes at the end of the authentication process. The proposed scheme is resistant to many practical attacks (e.g., impersonation attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and modification attack). In order to minimize the computational overhead, the scheme uses one-way hash functions and a symmetric cryptosystem.
Proposed scheme
The proposed authentication protocol for UHM system consists of three elements, namely MWSs, a PD, and an MS, and has three phases, namely initialization, registration, and authentication. The environment is established in the initialization phase. Each device firstly registers with the MS to be authenticated in the registration phase. When a device needs authority to access the system, it goes into the authentication phase. The notation used in this scheme is listed in Table 1 .
Initialization phase
The MS generates the parameters p (a 1024-bit prime number) and q (a 160-bit prime factor of p-1) and a generator, 
Registration phase
In order to become an accepted device, an MWS with its device number, w, must register with the MS in advance. The MS then executes the following steps to complete the registration.
Step 1. Generate a random number k [1,q] .
Step 2. Compute r = (g x mod p) mod q.
Step
Sign w as s = k -1 (h(w) + xr) mod q, where h(.) is a hash function. Step 4. Compute the secret key, k WS , that is shared by MWS and MS, where k WS = h(k||r||s) and || denotes concatenation.
Step 5. Store k WS , w, r, and s in the SIM card or memory card and send them to the MWS.
In order to become an accepted device, a PD must register with the MS and obtain an authentication ID, ID PD , and a secret key, k PS , which is shared between the PD and the MS.
Authentication phase
When the MWS tries to transmit the patient's information to the MS via the PD, mutual authentication between the MWS and the PD and between the PD and the MS must be executed in advance. The authentication process is described as follows.
Step 1. The MWS generates a random number, c 1 , and sends w, r, s, and c 1 to the PD. Step 2. Upon receiving the message, the PD encrypts the parameters ID PD , T 1 , w, r, s, and c 1 using the secret key, k PS , where T 1 is a timestamp. The PD then sends the encrypted message, ID PD , and T 1 to the MS. Step 3. Upon receiving the message, the MS executes the following actions:
Step 3-1. Decrypt the message to obtain the parameters ID PD , T 1 , w, r, s, and c 1 using the secret key, k PS.
Step 3-2. Check the timestamp T 1 and accept the connection if the timestamp is within the allowable period.
Step 3-3. Derive k as k = s -1 (h(w) + xr) mod q.
Step 3-4. Step 4. The MS encrypts the parameters ID MS , T 2 , c 2 , R 1 ', R 2 , and sk using the secret key, k PS , where T 2 is a timestamp.
The MS then sends the encrypted message, ID MS , and T 2 to the PD.
Step 5. Upon receiving the message, the PD executes the following actions:
Step 5-1. Decrypt the message to obtain the parameters ID MS , T 2 , c 2 , R 1 ', R 2 , and sk using the secret key, k PS .
Step 5-2. Check the timestamp T 2 .
Step 6. The PD sends c 2 ' to the PD.
Step 9. The PD accepts the WMS when the receiving R 2 ' is equal to the value of R 2 from the MS in
Step 5-1. If the authentication process is successful, only the MWS, the PD, and the MS possess the session key, sk, so the data can be confidentially transmitted between these three entities.
Analysis and discussion
This section provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the proposed user authentication scheme in terms of a security analysis and a loading analysis.
Security analysis
This section discusses the security properties of the system and common attacks.
Security properties
The security properties of a remote monitoring system must prevent any infringement of a patient's privacy and ensure that communication is secure. Protection of the patient's privacy requires anonymity. Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/ Transport Layer Security (TLS) protects communication flow but cannot verify a communication device or user. Mutual authentication can solve this problem. These issues are discussed below.
Patient anonymity
The patient's privacy is very important in a healthcare system, so patient anonymity is guaranteed by the proposed system. An attacker can only retrieve the device number, w, at
Step 1, the identity of a smart phone, ID PD , at Step 2, and the identity of the authentication server, ID MS , at Step 4. However, this data does not contain any personal information. This information does not allow an attacker to determine the identity of a patient.
4.1.1.2Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication is the most important property of a UHM system because it is difficult to determine who is communicating within a computer network. Malicious users can stay on the network and pretend to be another person in order to obtain valuable personal information. The MWS generates a nonce, c 1 , and sends it to the MS in order to ensure that the PD is authorized by the MS. The MS also generates a nonce, c 2 , for the PD to authorize the MWS. The MWS, and the PD can authenticate each other by using the trusted MS.
Common attacks
The most common attacks on a framework are discussed and an analysis of how the system prevents the attacks is provided.
Impersonation attack
Malicious attackers can pretend to be any element of the system, so all possible situations are considered. MWS', PD', and MS' are used to indicate the role of the attacker.
Case 1: A malicious attacker pretends to be an MWS that transmits wrong information
The MWS' has no knowledge about the correct signature (r,s). After the PD relays the wrong data to the MS, the MS replies with the R 1 ' and R 2 to the PD and the data is transferred to the MWS'. Because the MWS' lacks the correct key, k WS , it cannot compute the correct value of R 2 ' for the PD. The PD recognizes that the MWS' is a fake, so this attack cannot succeed.
Case 2: A malicious attacker pretends to be a PD and transmits
wrong information The MS can easily recognize the PD' as a fake since it lacks the correct key, k PS . When the wrong information is received at Step 6, the MWS easily rejects the PD' by checking the value of R 1 '. Therefore, this attack cannot succeed.
Case 3: A malicious attacker pretends to be the MS and
transmits wrong information After receiving the data at Step 4, the PD easily recognizes the MS' as a fake because the MS' cannot generate the correct data, K PS (ID MS ,T 2 ,c 2 ,R 1 ',R 2 ,sk), without knowledge of the correct secret key, k PS . Therefore, this attack cannot succeed.
Replay attack
A malicious attacker intercepts a message flow and replays the message flow later in order to gain authentication or access rights to the service. This design requires that all message flows between the PD and the MS include a time stamp (T 1 in Step 2 and T 2 in Step 3). When receiving a flow, the device always verifies the period of validity of the message and rejects any communication if the time has expired. Therefore, this attack cannot succeed.
Man-in-the-middle attack
A malicious user intercepts message flows and relays modified message flows in order to cheat both the communication devices and the users. The proposed scheme requires that both the PD and the MS transmit a partial message that is encrypted by the common secret key in Step 2 and Step 3, so only the appropriate device can decrypt the message. The fake message is easily detected by the PD or the MS, so this attack cannot succeed.
Modification attack
An attacker blocks the original message and then transmits a modified message. This attack is different from the man-in-the-middle attack because it does not cheat both the PD and the MS. However, this attack still cannot succeed because the PD and the MS communicate using encrypted messages and only they can decrypt these messages.
Insider attack
This attack depends on the system administrator having sufficient access rights to see the contents of the password table, allowing him to pretend to be a general user. However, in the proposed scheme, the MS does not record a password table, so an insider attack is impossible.
Loading analysis
Due to the storage and power limitations of MWSs, the length of a message and the function executed by the sensor are important because a system failure may occur when these two factors are incorrectly designed. In Step 1 of the authentication phase, the MWS must record w, r, and s. In order to ensure security, r and s must be 160 bits and w must be 64 bytes. For the message flow, the random nonce, c 1 , can be set to 160 bits, so the total message size is 480 bits + 64 bytes = 124 bytes. This size is suitable for currently available sensors. In order to reduce computation power, only three hash function executions are used on the sensor side.
Conclusion
An authentication protocol for UHM system for healthcare in a smart living environment was proposed. Because devices mutually authenticate each other and guarantee a secure communication, the protocol can prevent the transmitted patient-related data from the attacks of modification and interception as well as the attack of data fabrication. The security and loading analysis demonstrates that the proposed system is secure and is suitable for currently available wireless sensors. The data from the MWS can be transmitted to a distant MS through a PD. Therefore, the authentication protocol for UHM system can work successfully.
